Neopluralism vs. Multiple-Elite Theory
Dahl (1961) four basic concepts/cannons (Pluralism):
(1) Process
(2) Causation not influence (power as causation)
(3) Domain specificity
(4) Actors define own interests
We don't study influence, because you can't measure influence.
causation draws our analysis to a more scientific approach.
Power is hard to understand;
Pluralism has been rejected as an image on American society...due to IGs.
Multiple Elite Theory
few persons or groups exercise power
diffuse interests take a back seat
Olson (1964) and Lowi
IGs are numerous enough and do not have monopolistic power than it is okay pluralism didn't work.
Latent groups
Olgilopolies
Small groups
McFarland:
we SHOULD, indeed, focus on causation.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Monday, November 5, 2007
Aldrich (1995) Why Parties?
class notes 11.05.07
People who studny proganizations studiy three different reasons peple hve for joining:
incentives systems (3):
(1) material/instrumental: join for material benefits. people will support politicians who will make them better off (i.e. Reagan: "are you better off now than you were 4 years ago?") superficial and self-interested. (patronage benefit seeks; people who want contracts, jobs, subidies and other things that appeal to our self-interest). Blackwater USA has made a lot of money because of federal contracts; also, Bill Allen and oil in Alaska--government contracts that bring in revenue.
(2) solidary: human linkages, social solidarity. join for social interaction.
(3) purposive: people join organizations for a larger purpose--the benefit of the broader good; i.e. people who contribute to the boys and girls club, or animal cruelty otganizations. encompasses the policy activists.
Parties are driven from the top-down. they are driven by political actors (activists and politicians) seeking reelection (politicians want to be POLITICIAN, for whatever reason, they want to stay in office--career driven). but in order to do this, they may have to heed their constituents, and not just special interests.
reading notes:
Aldrich (1995) reading notes
Rational Choice Institutionalist Theory
Why Parties?
Aldrich’s basic argument is that political parties are the creation of politicians, ambitious office seekers, and officeholders, designed for the electoral ends they bring about (winning elections).
Parties are seen as ENDOGENOUS (That is, they are a creation of the actors themselves, which are INTERNAL. As opposed to exogenous institutions, which are created by an external source). The ACTORS are officeholders, and benefit seekers (their goal realization depends upon the party’s success in capturing office); not voters.
Three other views of the party
(1) parties are diverse coalitions (V.O. Key)
America political parties are broad and encompass a number of diverse interests
(2) parties are responsible; responsible parties thesis (Schattscheider)
normative
ideal type
a. make political commitments to electorate
b. carry out the commitments
c. develop alternatives to government policies when out of office
d. differ, giving electorate a range of options (diverse party platforms)
(3) parties are competitive (Downs)
parties are a team, that organizes to pursue goals (elections). They seem public support, to do so.
Important to consider, while reading:
Are parties strong? Weak? Do they matter/are they important? Obviously, Aldrich (1995) holds that they do matter, and indeed are strong, depending on location (i.e. party electorate, party in government, party organization) and historical context.
WHY PARTIES? They solve three (3) problems:
(1) The problem of Collective Action
The collective action problem contends that individually rational choices = inferior collective outcome (i.e. tragedy of the commons). Also, the c.a. problem is when “there are shared interests—ends that all value with some collectivity—but when it is not in people’s individual interests to contribute to that end” (100).
Consider game theory: for example, in certain game theory contexts, i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma, both prisoners, acting in their own self-interest end up failing. Parties help to overcome this problem, by organizing and mobilizing similar interests; parties aggregate interests.
Consider the calculus of voting (the trouble of mobilization in the face of little incentive):
R = PB + D –C
R=reward (if R is positive, one will vote)
P= probability that one’s vote will affect the outcome (near nil)
B= benefit (one will receive from the election of the more preferred candidate)
D= duty
C= costs
Parties can lower voting costs in order to ensure a positive “R” and thus, that people will vote.
(2) The Social Choice problem (the problem of true preference)
Arrow’s Possibility Theorem
When people are asked to rank their preferences, their individual prefs may not mirror that of the collective. Thus, it is a problem, because if considering government policies, govs have trouble aggregating different individual prefs to appease everyone. The way to overcome this problem is to instate a decision rule.
For example:
Individual preference > decision rule > societies preference.
An example of a decision rule is majority rule. But largely, no one’s no. 1 preference ends up being the rule.
(3) The Problem of Ambition (Ambition theory)
ambitious people are attracted to political; they are potentially corrupt; political parties serve as a gatekeeper—they regulate access to political offices.
Part 2 merely outlines the three problems (Social Choice, Collective Action and Ambition) with examples. Each example provides a principle, interests and institutional explanations to the paradox of why parties?
Social Choice and the foundation of the first parties (party in government):
The great principle
The PROBLEM facing Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison was over the power of federal government. How active should/would the federal government be? The SOLUTION was to turn to political parties. Hamilton and Jefferson/Madision set about organizing their support (big gov, v. small gov. which Aldrich called the “great principle”). “These efforts were driven by the consequences of majority instability, that is, by the social choice problem” (69). “The argument then is that what eventually became political parties in the modern sense were the solutions to one of the remaining great constitutional questions…Parties, therefore, eventually formed as institutional solutions to the instability of majority rule so that policies chosen or denied would reflect, in the main, just how strong and active the new national government was to be” (72).
The efforts by Hamilton and Jefferson to gradually strengthen political parties was to rally support for their position on the “great principle,” due to disequilibrium. “That is, institutional arrangements could induce equilibrium where preferences alone would not” (77). “PARTIES WERE CREATED TO HELP CONTRAIN VOTING TO BE BASED MORE HEAVILY ON THE GREAT PRINCIPLE, IN LARGE MEASURE, BY RELATING ALL OTHER ISSUES TO THE PARTISAN-GREAT PRINCIPLE DIMENSION” (91). “The first party system can be understood only as based in part on seeking to ensure that the actors’ beliefs about the appropriate size and power of the new federal government would be realized” (67).
Collective Action and Jacksonian democracy (mass parties):
Party principle
The PROBLEM facing Martin Van Buren was “to gather the resources sufficient to mobilize an increasingly far-flung electorate, so that Democrats could capture and use office for partisan purposes over a series of elections. To do so [he] invented the modern mass political party and, along with the Whigs, created what was unequivocally the first two-party system” (65). “The Jacksonian Democratic party can be understood only as an attempt to enact the “party principle.” The second party system can be understood only by its creators’ seeking in party to avoid the slavery issue and the threat it posed to the Union” (67). Van Buren avoided the slavery issue by creating the party, and monitoring/controlling the agenda.
Ambition theory and the Whigs and Republicans
The PROBLEM facing the Republicans was attracting supporters. In order to do so they expanded their platform to envelop an antislavery position. “The republican party ad most of its leaders were antislavery in outlook, but not abolitionists. It was northern party and it was a policy focused in appeal, but it was not an ideological party. This is, it was not solely antislavery or extremist. It was led by AMBITIOUS politicians who desired to see it become a viable, major party and who acted to see that that was accomplished. From a core of antislavery sentiment, it expanded broadly enough to achieve major party status” (156). “The third party system, and especially the actions of those who would become Republicans, can be understood only as in part the attempt to move in an increasingly antislavery direction” (67).
Part 3 looks at the party, in contemporary America:
Chapter 6 Party Activists and Party Cleavages
Why ideologically distinctive parties, even though conventional wisdom contends that there isn’t a dimes worth of difference between the two parties? “The answer I propose is a theory of parties-in-elections that leads to the existence of party cleavages in equilibrium nd to incentives for candidates to converge along those livs of cleavage in spite of countervailing incentives to converge to the policy center for attractiveness of popular support” (178).
The party-in-elections is Aldrich’s conception of the traditional party-in-electorate. He adopts the “elections” part because he sees them as external to the party, not internal, like the actors they aim to sway.
Aldrich (1995) distinguishes between activists (policy and patronage) and candidates.
PATRONAGE ACTIVISTS: more characteristic of Van Buren era; these activists depend on the party for jobs/contracts
POLICY ACTIVISTS: characteristic of today’s party; motivated by policy goals; “policy-motivated activists are typically under less pressure to support any party or candidate…they volunteer…” and the candidate is an instrument for achieving goals (182). “Activists have become a separate force to constrain the candidates…” they are less compatible, unlike patronage seekers which were more compatible with the candidate (183).
How do policy-motivated activists lead to the perception of ideologically partisan candidates? (3) ways:
(1) candidate recruitment
(2) candidate nomination
(3) activists = needed resource
Chapter 7 Political Parties and Governance
Parties serve to eliminate the collective action problem (207).
There are also partisan cleavages in government
People who studny proganizations studiy three different reasons peple hve for joining:
incentives systems (3):
(1) material/instrumental: join for material benefits. people will support politicians who will make them better off (i.e. Reagan: "are you better off now than you were 4 years ago?") superficial and self-interested. (patronage benefit seeks; people who want contracts, jobs, subidies and other things that appeal to our self-interest). Blackwater USA has made a lot of money because of federal contracts; also, Bill Allen and oil in Alaska--government contracts that bring in revenue.
(2) solidary: human linkages, social solidarity. join for social interaction.
(3) purposive: people join organizations for a larger purpose--the benefit of the broader good; i.e. people who contribute to the boys and girls club, or animal cruelty otganizations. encompasses the policy activists.
Parties are driven from the top-down. they are driven by political actors (activists and politicians) seeking reelection (politicians want to be POLITICIAN, for whatever reason, they want to stay in office--career driven). but in order to do this, they may have to heed their constituents, and not just special interests.
reading notes:
Aldrich (1995) reading notes
Rational Choice Institutionalist Theory
Why Parties?
Aldrich’s basic argument is that political parties are the creation of politicians, ambitious office seekers, and officeholders, designed for the electoral ends they bring about (winning elections).
Parties are seen as ENDOGENOUS (That is, they are a creation of the actors themselves, which are INTERNAL. As opposed to exogenous institutions, which are created by an external source). The ACTORS are officeholders, and benefit seekers (their goal realization depends upon the party’s success in capturing office); not voters.
Three other views of the party
(1) parties are diverse coalitions (V.O. Key)
America political parties are broad and encompass a number of diverse interests
(2) parties are responsible; responsible parties thesis (Schattscheider)
normative
ideal type
a. make political commitments to electorate
b. carry out the commitments
c. develop alternatives to government policies when out of office
d. differ, giving electorate a range of options (diverse party platforms)
(3) parties are competitive (Downs)
parties are a team, that organizes to pursue goals (elections). They seem public support, to do so.
Important to consider, while reading:
Are parties strong? Weak? Do they matter/are they important? Obviously, Aldrich (1995) holds that they do matter, and indeed are strong, depending on location (i.e. party electorate, party in government, party organization) and historical context.
WHY PARTIES? They solve three (3) problems:
(1) The problem of Collective Action
The collective action problem contends that individually rational choices = inferior collective outcome (i.e. tragedy of the commons). Also, the c.a. problem is when “there are shared interests—ends that all value with some collectivity—but when it is not in people’s individual interests to contribute to that end” (100).
Consider game theory: for example, in certain game theory contexts, i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma, both prisoners, acting in their own self-interest end up failing. Parties help to overcome this problem, by organizing and mobilizing similar interests; parties aggregate interests.
Consider the calculus of voting (the trouble of mobilization in the face of little incentive):
R = PB + D –C
R=reward (if R is positive, one will vote)
P= probability that one’s vote will affect the outcome (near nil)
B= benefit (one will receive from the election of the more preferred candidate)
D= duty
C= costs
Parties can lower voting costs in order to ensure a positive “R” and thus, that people will vote.
(2) The Social Choice problem (the problem of true preference)
Arrow’s Possibility Theorem
When people are asked to rank their preferences, their individual prefs may not mirror that of the collective. Thus, it is a problem, because if considering government policies, govs have trouble aggregating different individual prefs to appease everyone. The way to overcome this problem is to instate a decision rule.
For example:
Individual preference > decision rule > societies preference.
An example of a decision rule is majority rule. But largely, no one’s no. 1 preference ends up being the rule.
(3) The Problem of Ambition (Ambition theory)
ambitious people are attracted to political; they are potentially corrupt; political parties serve as a gatekeeper—they regulate access to political offices.
Part 2 merely outlines the three problems (Social Choice, Collective Action and Ambition) with examples. Each example provides a principle, interests and institutional explanations to the paradox of why parties?
Social Choice and the foundation of the first parties (party in government):
The great principle
The PROBLEM facing Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison was over the power of federal government. How active should/would the federal government be? The SOLUTION was to turn to political parties. Hamilton and Jefferson/Madision set about organizing their support (big gov, v. small gov. which Aldrich called the “great principle”). “These efforts were driven by the consequences of majority instability, that is, by the social choice problem” (69). “The argument then is that what eventually became political parties in the modern sense were the solutions to one of the remaining great constitutional questions…Parties, therefore, eventually formed as institutional solutions to the instability of majority rule so that policies chosen or denied would reflect, in the main, just how strong and active the new national government was to be” (72).
The efforts by Hamilton and Jefferson to gradually strengthen political parties was to rally support for their position on the “great principle,” due to disequilibrium. “That is, institutional arrangements could induce equilibrium where preferences alone would not” (77). “PARTIES WERE CREATED TO HELP CONTRAIN VOTING TO BE BASED MORE HEAVILY ON THE GREAT PRINCIPLE, IN LARGE MEASURE, BY RELATING ALL OTHER ISSUES TO THE PARTISAN-GREAT PRINCIPLE DIMENSION” (91). “The first party system can be understood only as based in part on seeking to ensure that the actors’ beliefs about the appropriate size and power of the new federal government would be realized” (67).
Collective Action and Jacksonian democracy (mass parties):
Party principle
The PROBLEM facing Martin Van Buren was “to gather the resources sufficient to mobilize an increasingly far-flung electorate, so that Democrats could capture and use office for partisan purposes over a series of elections. To do so [he] invented the modern mass political party and, along with the Whigs, created what was unequivocally the first two-party system” (65). “The Jacksonian Democratic party can be understood only as an attempt to enact the “party principle.” The second party system can be understood only by its creators’ seeking in party to avoid the slavery issue and the threat it posed to the Union” (67). Van Buren avoided the slavery issue by creating the party, and monitoring/controlling the agenda.
Ambition theory and the Whigs and Republicans
The PROBLEM facing the Republicans was attracting supporters. In order to do so they expanded their platform to envelop an antislavery position. “The republican party ad most of its leaders were antislavery in outlook, but not abolitionists. It was northern party and it was a policy focused in appeal, but it was not an ideological party. This is, it was not solely antislavery or extremist. It was led by AMBITIOUS politicians who desired to see it become a viable, major party and who acted to see that that was accomplished. From a core of antislavery sentiment, it expanded broadly enough to achieve major party status” (156). “The third party system, and especially the actions of those who would become Republicans, can be understood only as in part the attempt to move in an increasingly antislavery direction” (67).
Part 3 looks at the party, in contemporary America:
Chapter 6 Party Activists and Party Cleavages
Why ideologically distinctive parties, even though conventional wisdom contends that there isn’t a dimes worth of difference between the two parties? “The answer I propose is a theory of parties-in-elections that leads to the existence of party cleavages in equilibrium nd to incentives for candidates to converge along those livs of cleavage in spite of countervailing incentives to converge to the policy center for attractiveness of popular support” (178).
The party-in-elections is Aldrich’s conception of the traditional party-in-electorate. He adopts the “elections” part because he sees them as external to the party, not internal, like the actors they aim to sway.
Aldrich (1995) distinguishes between activists (policy and patronage) and candidates.
PATRONAGE ACTIVISTS: more characteristic of Van Buren era; these activists depend on the party for jobs/contracts
POLICY ACTIVISTS: characteristic of today’s party; motivated by policy goals; “policy-motivated activists are typically under less pressure to support any party or candidate…they volunteer…” and the candidate is an instrument for achieving goals (182). “Activists have become a separate force to constrain the candidates…” they are less compatible, unlike patronage seekers which were more compatible with the candidate (183).
How do policy-motivated activists lead to the perception of ideologically partisan candidates? (3) ways:
(1) candidate recruitment
(2) candidate nomination
(3) activists = needed resource
Chapter 7 Political Parties and Governance
Parties serve to eliminate the collective action problem (207).
There are also partisan cleavages in government
Fisher (2007) “Invoking Inherent Powers: A Primer.” (vs expressed powers and implied powers)
Expressed powers: Clearly stated in the Constitution (i.e. Constitution Article II)
Implied powers: intrinsic?
Article II of the Constitution gives the President “inherent powers.”
But Fisher argues that inherent powers are always shady... we can't leave it up to the president to define the claims of the office; we need to rule out the argument, based of the basis of extreme FUZZINESS.
History of the powers’ use:
Abe Lincoln and the suspension of the writ of habeus corpus during the Civil War.
Harry S. Truman and the “police action” (war) with South Korea; Truman claimed it was an “emergency action” and the president has the right to “act for whatever is best for the country” (6). Truman later seized the steel mills, as well.
Commentary:
Commager and Schlesinger Jr. (both political scholars) first condoned Truman’s actions; they later reneged, and apologized for contributing to the façade that president’s are all powerful.
Neustadt (1960) explores the president and power, and says the president’s power is irrevocably tied up in his ability to persuade. “Neustadt measured presidential success by action, vigor, decisiveness, initiative, energy, and personal power” (9).
Yoo (1996) wrote, “the framers of the condistition created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war. Congress was given a role in war-making decisions not by the Declare War Clause, but by its power over finding and impeachment.
Fisher (2007) disagrees with Yoo (1996) and Neustadt (1960); he sites the First Article of the Constitution, among other things…
Case Study: G.W.Bush
Invoking inherent powers
(1) MILIARY COMMISSIONS
On Nov. 13, 2001, a ruling was made which gave the president the authority to convener military commissions. This power arises “from the constitutions vesting in the president of the executive power and the power of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces” (13). These commissions acted outside the law, under the condition that they were established by the president, exercising his legal and legitimate powers.
AUMF-Authorities for Use of Military Force
UCMJ-Uniform Code of Military Justice
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) found commission to violate UCMJ.
(2) ENEMY COMBATANTS
Enemy combatants has come to mean citizens of the United States which are found to be enemies of the state, and thus can be treated as such (certain rights guaranteed to citizens are taken away). The president invoked this power under the condition that “the Constitution vests the president with exclusive authority to act as Commander in Chief and as the nations sole organ in Foreign Affairs” (13), and the courts should not second guess his position/decision. The president is more familiar with military actions/business.
*on June 28, 2004 the Supreme Court rejected that Hamdan’s detention was soley a presidential decision, and thus intervened. Sandra Day-O-Connor announced “…a state of war is not a blank check for the President…”; the courts ruling established that exchanges with other nations in times of conflict “most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake…” (14).
(3) TORTURE MEMOS
Found Geneva Conventions to not apply to members of Al Qaeda organizations (memo written by Yoo & Delahunty in 2002). “As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to order interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence…” (15). Further, the Torture Statute does not apply to the conduct of personal at GITMO (this they are essentially above international law).
*at the end of 2004 the OLC (Office of Legal Cousel) released a memo condemning torture. Alberto Gonzales claimed the memo did not apply to CIA activities, thus deliberately separating the standard set for the Department of Defense and the CIA.
(4) EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
“Allows detainees to be sent to another country for interrogation and torture” (16). “In court the Bush administrtion argued that individuals subject to extraordinary rendition are barred from litigating their grievances because a lawsuit would risk the disclosure of state secrets and encroach on independent presidential authority: ‘The state secrets privledge is based on the President’s Article II power to conduct foreign affairs and to provide for the national defense, and therefore has constitutional underpinnings” (17). Condi Rice rose to the defense when she said rendition is not unique to the US or the current administration.
*On September 6, 2006 Bush confirmed the existence of CIA operations abroad for the purpose of interrogating suspects; the Senate republicans insisted on a military bill that would provide for continued tough interrogation of suspects.
(5) NSA EAVESDROPPING
In the months following 9/11 Bush authorized the NSA to listen to those in the US without a court-approved warrant (phones and emails) to obtain evidence of terrorist plots.
on December 19, 2005, Bush stated “I hate the constitutional responsibility and authority to protect our country. Article II gives me the responsibility and authority to fulfill it” (18). FISA (foreign intelligence surveillance act) court was created in 1978 to authorize such activity. Bush did not consult the FISA court. Gonzales said he did not because “it would have been difficult if not impossible” to get permission; and they had to act quickly.
Conclusion:
How much power should the president be given, under Article II of the Constitution? What does the instigation of inherent powers say of the “vitality of republican government, popular sovereignty and the traditional checks and balances that channel political power and limit its abuse” (20)?
Expressed powers: Clearly stated in the Constitution (i.e. Constitution Article II)
Implied powers: intrinsic?
Article II of the Constitution gives the President “inherent powers.”
But Fisher argues that inherent powers are always shady... we can't leave it up to the president to define the claims of the office; we need to rule out the argument, based of the basis of extreme FUZZINESS.
History of the powers’ use:
Abe Lincoln and the suspension of the writ of habeus corpus during the Civil War.
Harry S. Truman and the “police action” (war) with South Korea; Truman claimed it was an “emergency action” and the president has the right to “act for whatever is best for the country” (6). Truman later seized the steel mills, as well.
Commentary:
Commager and Schlesinger Jr. (both political scholars) first condoned Truman’s actions; they later reneged, and apologized for contributing to the façade that president’s are all powerful.
Neustadt (1960) explores the president and power, and says the president’s power is irrevocably tied up in his ability to persuade. “Neustadt measured presidential success by action, vigor, decisiveness, initiative, energy, and personal power” (9).
Yoo (1996) wrote, “the framers of the condistition created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war. Congress was given a role in war-making decisions not by the Declare War Clause, but by its power over finding and impeachment.
Fisher (2007) disagrees with Yoo (1996) and Neustadt (1960); he sites the First Article of the Constitution, among other things…
Case Study: G.W.Bush
Invoking inherent powers
(1) MILIARY COMMISSIONS
On Nov. 13, 2001, a ruling was made which gave the president the authority to convener military commissions. This power arises “from the constitutions vesting in the president of the executive power and the power of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces” (13). These commissions acted outside the law, under the condition that they were established by the president, exercising his legal and legitimate powers.
AUMF-Authorities for Use of Military Force
UCMJ-Uniform Code of Military Justice
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) found commission to violate UCMJ.
(2) ENEMY COMBATANTS
Enemy combatants has come to mean citizens of the United States which are found to be enemies of the state, and thus can be treated as such (certain rights guaranteed to citizens are taken away). The president invoked this power under the condition that “the Constitution vests the president with exclusive authority to act as Commander in Chief and as the nations sole organ in Foreign Affairs” (13), and the courts should not second guess his position/decision. The president is more familiar with military actions/business.
*on June 28, 2004 the Supreme Court rejected that Hamdan’s detention was soley a presidential decision, and thus intervened. Sandra Day-O-Connor announced “…a state of war is not a blank check for the President…”; the courts ruling established that exchanges with other nations in times of conflict “most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake…” (14).
(3) TORTURE MEMOS
Found Geneva Conventions to not apply to members of Al Qaeda organizations (memo written by Yoo & Delahunty in 2002). “As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to order interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence…” (15). Further, the Torture Statute does not apply to the conduct of personal at GITMO (this they are essentially above international law).
*at the end of 2004 the OLC (Office of Legal Cousel) released a memo condemning torture. Alberto Gonzales claimed the memo did not apply to CIA activities, thus deliberately separating the standard set for the Department of Defense and the CIA.
(4) EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
“Allows detainees to be sent to another country for interrogation and torture” (16). “In court the Bush administrtion argued that individuals subject to extraordinary rendition are barred from litigating their grievances because a lawsuit would risk the disclosure of state secrets and encroach on independent presidential authority: ‘The state secrets privledge is based on the President’s Article II power to conduct foreign affairs and to provide for the national defense, and therefore has constitutional underpinnings” (17). Condi Rice rose to the defense when she said rendition is not unique to the US or the current administration.
*On September 6, 2006 Bush confirmed the existence of CIA operations abroad for the purpose of interrogating suspects; the Senate republicans insisted on a military bill that would provide for continued tough interrogation of suspects.
(5) NSA EAVESDROPPING
In the months following 9/11 Bush authorized the NSA to listen to those in the US without a court-approved warrant (phones and emails) to obtain evidence of terrorist plots.
on December 19, 2005, Bush stated “I hate the constitutional responsibility and authority to protect our country. Article II gives me the responsibility and authority to fulfill it” (18). FISA (foreign intelligence surveillance act) court was created in 1978 to authorize such activity. Bush did not consult the FISA court. Gonzales said he did not because “it would have been difficult if not impossible” to get permission; and they had to act quickly.
Conclusion:
How much power should the president be given, under Article II of the Constitution? What does the instigation of inherent powers say of the “vitality of republican government, popular sovereignty and the traditional checks and balances that channel political power and limit its abuse” (20)?
Quirk (2005) In Nelson's The Presidency and the Political System
Chapter 5 Presidential Competence--the strategic competence model
Our president's have differed in their skill as leaders. SOme have been good at management, others at persuasion, and still come at bargaining or rhetoric. What are the most important characteristics of our presidents?
There are (3) three models of presidential competence:
(1) Self-Relient Model i.e. FDR
very idealistic (Neustadt 1960); have a grip of most things.
(2) Minimalist Modeil i.e. G.W.Bush
too little information; requires little or no uderstanding of issues; this president relies upon subordinates. Does this president risk being captured by the advisors they themselves selected?
(3) Strategic Competence Model
this president gets as much information that they can within reason; mainly they are knowledgeable about the decision making process; moreso than their knowledge of the policies themselves. they are able to distiguish between good arguments, and "loud" arguments.
What do president's need to know about debate?
should they be able to question their advisors arguments?
facsilitor?
orchestrator?
discussant?
make judgements about the quality of evidence and logic?
but WHO is debating?
PROCESSES OF POLICY DELIBERATION:
(1) mainstream social science (i have a job!!)
(2) multiple advocacy (include the preference position of various advocates)
(3) honest broker
(4) CITIZENS?
Our president's have differed in their skill as leaders. SOme have been good at management, others at persuasion, and still come at bargaining or rhetoric. What are the most important characteristics of our presidents?
There are (3) three models of presidential competence:
(1) Self-Relient Model i.e. FDR
very idealistic (Neustadt 1960); have a grip of most things.
(2) Minimalist Modeil i.e. G.W.Bush
too little information; requires little or no uderstanding of issues; this president relies upon subordinates. Does this president risk being captured by the advisors they themselves selected?
(3) Strategic Competence Model
this president gets as much information that they can within reason; mainly they are knowledgeable about the decision making process; moreso than their knowledge of the policies themselves. they are able to distiguish between good arguments, and "loud" arguments.
What do president's need to know about debate?
should they be able to question their advisors arguments?
facsilitor?
orchestrator?
discussant?
make judgements about the quality of evidence and logic?
but WHO is debating?
PROCESSES OF POLICY DELIBERATION:
(1) mainstream social science (i have a job!!)
(2) multiple advocacy (include the preference position of various advocates)
(3) honest broker
(4) CITIZENS?
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