215 Public Opinion
manipulation and government responsiveness
Manza (2002)
Chapter 1 The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: The State of the Debate (Manza & Cook)
This chapter examines the current debate on the IMPACT of public opinion on policy. There are three (3) images of the impact:
(1) Large Effects images of the impact of p.o.; effects of public opinion on policy making supported by empirical work and quantitative studies that report a strong correlation between majority opinion on an issue and policy outcomes. Case study research returns similar findings. (Erikson, MacKuen, Stimson)
(2)Small effects images of the impact p.o.; only a limited connection between p.o. and policy outcome because either:
(a) Elites manipulate, control or direct p.o., thus any correlation is spurious; and they do so without fear of retribution. Politicians please IGs, activists, and articulate actors. (Jacobs & Shapiro would fit here—they write in subsequent chapters (3 and 10 about “crafted talk”)
(b) p.o. lacks coherence, thus cannot produce an independent causal impact—non-attitudes (see Campbell 1964) (an issue of political sophistication in both cases?)
(3) Contingency effect: in some contexts p.o. moves policy, and in others it does not (when it is more organized due to motivation, information, salience of issue? Or when it is loudest? Or it is most constistent, sustained (Jacobs 1994)?). (V.O. Key’s work fits in this category). “Depending on the particular issue, Congress members say they are influenced differently by what the public thinks” (27).
Chapter 2 Public Opinion and Policy: Causal Flow in a Macro System Model (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson)
Large effects view. Systems Model. Analyzing the changes in public MOOD and governmental outcomes (policy (measured as legislation) or policy activity (measured as movement on issues/topics etc).
Independent variable—mood: measured by condensing available public opinion across a wide range of policies into single indicator.
Dependent variable—conservative/liberal policy: activity or laws adopted in each year.
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) strongly contend that the issues of the day are a reflection of the public mood, meeting the goal of democratic theory in the expression of a “ causal dynamic by which the preferences of constituencies cause the behavior of the representatives…” (36). Using both cross-sectional (raw correlations) and time-series (“exploits temporal order to infer causal order” (36)) data, the authors come to the same conclusions: policy activity and policy reflects the public mood. As mood expressed more liberal ideals, policy did as well. As policies became more liberal, mood became more conservative, and the polcies then reflected the shift.
Authors also address this as a ‘”feedback” process through which policies influence later public opinion (similar to Hacker 2002; Campbell 2003, though not identical).
Chapter 3 Politics and Policymaking in the Real World: Crafted Talk and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Jacobs and Shapiro)
small-effects view.
Small effects due to Institutional and Historical changes: influence of activists within party organizations, IG activity growth… The findings of Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson (2002) are challenged by Jacobs & Shapiro. Certain institutional changes have altered the landscape and, in turn, the ability of presidents to manipulate, instead of follow, public opinion. Jacobs & Shapiro (2000; 2002) site partisan polarization, institutional individuation, incumbency bias, interest group proliferation, proximity of elections, caucuses and primaries, and the move toward candidate-centered campaigning as enabling politicians to get away with “crafted talk.” Crafted talk is language that is designed to elicit responses in tune with an administration’s or politician’s own, predetermined, policy goals. And their conception of the public interest. This is achieved by way of focus groups and polls that uncover words, symbols and stories that coerce positive feelings toward the already set agenda (see also Cook, Barabas & Page chapter 8). For example, focus groups might uncover more positive feelings toward “opportunity scholarships” as opposed to “vouchers.” If this were the case a politician in support of vouchers would use “opportunity scholarship” language to attract support for his or her policy position. Uncovering the use of language in this manner lends support to scholars who reject the claim that heuristic short cuts are tantamount to full political knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990); the “opportunity scholarship” heuristic is misleading.
The Authors thus suggest a different link between p.o. and policy than that of Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson. Instead of politicians following p.o. they use p.o. constructively—strategic uses of p.o. to create crafted talk. Conceptualized politicians as self-interested, election-focued.
Chapter 4 Panderers or Shirkers? Politicians and Public Opinion (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson)
respond to Jacobs and Shapiro.
Chapter 7 The Power Elite, Public Policy and Public Opinion (Domhoff)
Bound-effects view? Power Elite Model
Elites have the power; public opinion only moves policy within the constraints established by the agenda already set by elites. Says that when Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, by focusing on the movement of p.o. over time, see the trees but miss the forest. Elites ensure that certain policy ideas are never considered in the first place .
Domhoff (2002) recognizes how power can shape public opinion on more complex issues, such as economic, defense, and foreign policy issues. In his analysis, the source of power is “a dominant social class consisting of the owners and managers of large income-producing properties” (124):
Their predominant power is demonstrated by their large—and growing—share of the wealth and income distributions, their disproportionate share of high-level appointments in Washington, and the fact that they win far more often than they lose on the policy issues of concern to them…The power elite prevails more often than not through...special interest, policy planning, opinion shaping, and candidate selection (125).
The power elite shape
(1) the special interest process
(2) the policy planning process
(3) the opinion shaping process
(4) the candidate selection process
The special interest process is shaped elitist lobbying of legislatures. Although interest group influence is high, corporate v. corporate interests sometime limit their effect, as do rises in iberal or labor group organization mobilization.
Policy-planning is influenced by elite think tanks.
The ways in which the power elite shape public opinion are three-fold: (1) through donations to political leaders, who in-turn give speeches and press conferences which influence the general public; (2) through directors who use their money to form policy discussion groups lead by speakers who push the agenda of the upper-class onto the public; and through (3) public relation firms which are funded by the upper class to create stories or poll results which are to be picked up by the media and then trickle down to the public, or more directly, through gifts or threats to the general public. In each scenario, the elites’ money plays the lead-role and enables them to lead pubic opinion.
Candidate selection: the 2 major parties are the only viable parties (Duverge’s Law); this is the class-dominance model, and it holds that those with power maintain their power.
In conclusion, politicians are in tune with the power elite because they have a direct stake in politics, and the elites have a lot of control over the politicians career (contributions, etc). More moderate interests are not as well organized, and are often divided on race, religion, or class. The power elite are more homogenous, and it is to their advantage.
Chapter 8 Policy Elites Invoke Public Opinion: Polls, Policy Debates, and the Future of Social Security (Cook, Barabas & Page)
Elites construct public views to advance policy positions. For example, in the SS debate, politicians claim that young people do not believe they will receive their SS when they retire. But this claim “rests on extremely misleading polling data and has been overturned by subsequent surveys with more adequate tests…” (8). Yet it is a claim that politicians still use when debating SS. Thus, politicians invoke public opinion to support positions they already hold. This argument is similar to Jacobs and Shapiro and “crafted talk.”
Chapter 9 How State-Level Policy Managers “Read” Public Opinion (Herbst)
At the state-level there is less polling data available. Thus state-level politicians “read” p.o. in other ways. For instance, policy-managers pay close attention to the arguments of IGs (me: good indicator of PUBLIC opinion?), and the media (i.e. newspapers) to stay “in-tune.” Thus at the state-level politicians receive flawed in-puts. Exposed to biases in local news (more episodic; sensationalist due to market-based news/trying to sell! And attract viewers). Why should we assume its okay for policy-makers to listen to this? In the past, I thought we assumed local politicians read their letters to get a sense of the public sentiment. But WHO writes the letters? Fringe? At the local level do we elect a trustee, instead of a delegate?
Chapter 10 Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and Democracy: How Presidents Use Public Opinion (Shapiro & Jacobs)
Shift to a Foreign policy p.o. focus. FP is less a subject of analysis because the public tends to be more uninformed about FP than domestic issues (me: since Iraq, is this still the case? And is the media the reason? Or personal interest, such as “I know a soldier?). The author’s results mimic their earlier results on domestic issue p.o. influence, only a bit heighted: politicians use “crafted talk” and the public voice is increasingly confused.
Shapiro & Jacobs find crafted talk to be especially pronounced when politicians discuss foreign policy. Although they review numerous examples of presidents responding to public opinion, such as Nixon and the troop with drawl from Vietnam, they argue, “that the dominant contemporary trend is toward less presidential responsiveness and greater efforts at leading or manipulating public opinion” (192). Thus, along with the aforementioned institutional shifts that have given way to “crafted talk” on domestic issues, these institutional changes coupled with a more confused electorate—which is often the case in matters of foreign policy—creates prime conditions for politicians to lead and manipulate public opinion. In the wake of institutional shifts and heightened electorate confusion, politicians have power over public opinion and “create the appearance of responsiveness as they pursue their desired policy goals” (Jacobs & Shapiro 2002, 55, emphasis added). As in their earlier chapter, this is due to institutional changes in the political system.
Chapter 11 How Policymakers Misperceive U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (Kull & Ramsay)
The authors find evidence of inconsistencies between public opinion and public policy, and that it is increasing over time. They also find that the public perceives policy-makers to misunderstand them.
Elites badly misunderstand the nature of public attitudes; they assume the public is isolationist (based on earlier interviews in Kull & Destker 1999). Gathering new data from a survey that taps isolationist sentiment, the author’s show that the public is more internationalist and supportive of programs designed to aid poor foreign countries than experts think (me: I think historical context matters on this one. For instance, right now I would say that given the mess in Iraq, yes. But shortly after 9/11?—no way—look hard at their data and when it was gathered). Thus, politicians take public opinion for granted.
16 The Sovereign Status of Survey Data (Lee)
18 The Semi-Sovereign Public (Page)
Friday, December 14, 2007
Cohen (1995) Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda
Cohen (2005) “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda”
How much influence does presidential rhetoric have over the public’s agenda? Cohen (1995) expects to find that the more attention the president gives to a policy area in his State of the Union Address, the more concerned the public will be about that area. Cohen finds that “mere presidential mentions of a policy area seems to elicit a public response, thus presidents do not have to resort to substantive arguments to sway public opinion. (another CON!!).
Behr & Iyengar (1985) find that the president does indeed have influence on the public via speeches; when they devote time to a topic, the public responds.
The literature is split; one camp looks at the ability of the president to manipulate their popularity ratings through political drama, like making speeches. MacKuen (1983) fnds this to be a way for presidents to boost approval, but the effects are short-lived.
Others find that presidents may only successfully lead public opinion when they are popular.
Why is agenda control so important? “By controlling the agenda, the president may secure success with Congress. He may be able to keep issues that he dislikes from the agenda, while advancing those that he favors. He can use the agenda settting power strategically, promoting issues that Congress is likely to pass, demoting those that are controversial. Such strategic behavior may foster the appearance of being a winner, and research suggests that winning in Congress boosts presidential popularity, which may feedback into legislative success. Manipulating the agenda for political advantage may help presidential efforts with Congress” (Cohen 1995, 88).
The public is more receptive to the president (Cohen 1995). They demand and expect leadership from the Office, and is even psychologically relient on the president (Greenstein 1974). “The president stands about all others in the political aren, with the greater public prestige, attention and responsibility, in effect “monopolizing the public space” (Miroff 1982)” (11). This suggests a symbolic appeal. Given this, the president has resources to get public support for his agenda.
But when policy areas are less recognizes/understood, does the president resort to substantive emphasis and argumentation? In other words, the president takes a position, instead of just mentioning the policy area such as “foreign policy.” Cohen (1995) finds that when the president takes a position on the policy, the effects are the same as when the president merely mentions the policy area. “The public seems to respond directly to anything that the president says” (99). “The president does not have to convince the public that a policy problem is important by offering substantive positives. Merely mentioning a problem to the pubic heightens public convcen with the policy problem” (102).
But it is fleeting; only FP policy area is restructured, long-term.
The president is an agenda gate keeper (Cohen 1995, 99):
“Presidential attention focuses the public n those areas, while distracting the public from other problems. Thus, the president acts as an agenda gate keeper, where his impact n the public’s agenda filters concerns onto or away from the public’s agenda” (99).
How much influence does presidential rhetoric have over the public’s agenda? Cohen (1995) expects to find that the more attention the president gives to a policy area in his State of the Union Address, the more concerned the public will be about that area. Cohen finds that “mere presidential mentions of a policy area seems to elicit a public response, thus presidents do not have to resort to substantive arguments to sway public opinion. (another CON!!).
Behr & Iyengar (1985) find that the president does indeed have influence on the public via speeches; when they devote time to a topic, the public responds.
The literature is split; one camp looks at the ability of the president to manipulate their popularity ratings through political drama, like making speeches. MacKuen (1983) fnds this to be a way for presidents to boost approval, but the effects are short-lived.
Others find that presidents may only successfully lead public opinion when they are popular.
Why is agenda control so important? “By controlling the agenda, the president may secure success with Congress. He may be able to keep issues that he dislikes from the agenda, while advancing those that he favors. He can use the agenda settting power strategically, promoting issues that Congress is likely to pass, demoting those that are controversial. Such strategic behavior may foster the appearance of being a winner, and research suggests that winning in Congress boosts presidential popularity, which may feedback into legislative success. Manipulating the agenda for political advantage may help presidential efforts with Congress” (Cohen 1995, 88).
The public is more receptive to the president (Cohen 1995). They demand and expect leadership from the Office, and is even psychologically relient on the president (Greenstein 1974). “The president stands about all others in the political aren, with the greater public prestige, attention and responsibility, in effect “monopolizing the public space” (Miroff 1982)” (11). This suggests a symbolic appeal. Given this, the president has resources to get public support for his agenda.
But when policy areas are less recognizes/understood, does the president resort to substantive emphasis and argumentation? In other words, the president takes a position, instead of just mentioning the policy area such as “foreign policy.” Cohen (1995) finds that when the president takes a position on the policy, the effects are the same as when the president merely mentions the policy area. “The public seems to respond directly to anything that the president says” (99). “The president does not have to convince the public that a policy problem is important by offering substantive positives. Merely mentioning a problem to the pubic heightens public convcen with the policy problem” (102).
But it is fleeting; only FP policy area is restructured, long-term.
The president is an agenda gate keeper (Cohen 1995, 99):
“Presidential attention focuses the public n those areas, while distracting the public from other problems. Thus, the president acts as an agenda gate keeper, where his impact n the public’s agenda filters concerns onto or away from the public’s agenda” (99).
Chong & Druckman (2007) Framing Theory
Chong & Druckman (2007) “Framing Theory”
A review of framing and the effects of framing on public opinion.
Framing: the process by when people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980; Nelson et al. 1990).
Framing Effects: occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue of an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion.
Frames in Communication (106) “the key considerations emphasized in a speech act” (106).
Frames in Comm “organizinges everyday realitly”. They provide meaning to a strip of events. And promote certain definitions over others, and encourage a particular interpretation (Shah et al, 202, 343).
There are a number of culturally available frames in elite discourse (Gamson & Modigiani 1987).
“Frames in comm. matter—that is they affect the attitudes and beaviors of their audiences” (109).
What are individual-level mediators and moderators of framing?
Eagly & Chaiken (1993): Available, Accessible, and Applicable
AVAILABLE
“In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration—say free speech in the evaluation of a hate group’s right to rally—needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. If, for example, an individual fails to understand the concept of free speech, then free speech is not an available consideration and the individual will not be affected by a free speech frame” (110).
ACCESIBLE
“In addition to being available, the consideration must be accessible, meaning its activation potential must exceed a certain threshold so that the consideration is retrieved from long-term memory” (110).
The individual’s “frame of thought” (105).
APPLICABLE
“Evaluations of applicability occur if one of the following 2 considerations is met: they must be motivated and they must deliberate over alternatives” (110).
“In sun, people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three levels, by making new believes available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, o making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations” (111).
“Obviously, one’s frame in through can have a marked impacted on one’s overall opinion. For this reason, politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies long particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values (Jacoby 2000, 51).
People have inconsistent opinions, if they have them at all (Converse1964; Zaller 1992).
Strong frames often rest on symbols, etc. heuristics rather than direct information.
A frame’s strength depends on:
(1) repetition of frame
(2) competitive environment
(3) individual motivations
Moderators:
a. indiv. Values “indivs who have strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values (Brewer 2003; Gross 2000). Usually we are given competing frames. When this is the case, we choose the alt. that is consistent with our values (Sniderman & Theriault 2004). It increases our internal consistency. But Chong & Druckman find that the more competitive frame usually wins out, and there is potential for either side to steal voters.
b. Knowledge—framing effects stronger on less educated (Kinder & Sanders 1990 ; Haider-Markel & Jaslyn 2001). Stronger on more educated (Miller & Krosnik 2000; Nelson et al. 1997). Druckman & Nelson (2003) find that “after controlling for prior attitudes, knowledge enhances framing effects because it increases the likelihood that the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual” (112). See Lodge & Taber (2000) for discussion over stability of opinion v. dogmatic inflexibility (Chong & Druckman 120): “At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative framings of a problem; at the other extreme we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits clthe same close-minded response.” DELIBERATION!! Openness to contrarary evidence is essential. And should be fostered in a democracy. “People’s familiarity with this issue prior to the experiment does not appear to have inoculated them against manipulation (119). “A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations or arguments by independently generating courterarguments against one-sided frames” (119). = Top of the Head argument, rings true (Zaller 1992).
c. Source credibility (112).
Priming (Iyengar & Kinder 1987): “by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, tv news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged. Priming prefers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (63).
Framing v. Persuasion
Nleson & Oxley (1999): there is distinction between changing the content of one’s beliefs (persuasion) and changing the weight assigned to different beliefs in one’s overall attitude (framing).
Framing can be positive or negative:
It can rally people around a shared prediction.
Or, its can signify elite manipulation.
Entman (2004): Cascade Model:
Frames originate from the administration shape the frames used by other elites (. e.g. members of Congress), media outlets, and the public. However the public’s reaction to the initial frame feeds back to the media and other elites, who then influence the admins revised view.
“Balanced debate can diminish framing effects only if citizens are capable of learning over the course of a campaign. An individual can claim to have an opinion only if his or her views can be distinguished from the set of considerations temporarily made accessible by the content of a communication. A doorstep opinion” or an opinion constructed “on the fly” is not a real opinion if it is inseparable from the context in which it was elicited” (119).
“The inferences we can draw from previous studies suggest only limited inoculation against framing effects in all but the most knowledgeable members of the public. If citizens are inoculated on longstanding issues, we should see considerable resistance to one-sided frames on these issues. However, studies show that experimental participants continue to be affected by one-sided frames on issues that have been much debated in the past” (119). But one-sided frames do have a greater impact on those that are less knowledgeable (119). Manipulation.
“Competition therefore may only increase the short-term accessibility of alternative considerations. A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations of arguments by independently generating counterarguments against one-sided frames. “These results may appear to render framing effects more innocuous, but they may also indicate that individuals are continually susceptible to the most recent communication. If people soon forget what they learn, then they are less likely to be inoculated against subsequent attempts to influence them. The benefits of a balanced debate in a political campaign depend on the capacity of citizens to retain information about alternative positions so that they are not unduly influenced by the latest message they receive” (119).
“To the extent that people do not have independent ideas on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the framing of proposals. If people remain outside the political process, their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped by arbitrarily by how the issue is represented” (122).
Individuals who hold strong attitudes are least susceptible to new information, most likely to counter argue against contrary information, and most likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs” (120). Thus stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evals (120). “Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait
A review of framing and the effects of framing on public opinion.
Framing: the process by when people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980; Nelson et al. 1990).
Framing Effects: occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue of an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion.
Frames in Communication (106) “the key considerations emphasized in a speech act” (106).
Frames in Comm “organizinges everyday realitly”. They provide meaning to a strip of events. And promote certain definitions over others, and encourage a particular interpretation (Shah et al, 202, 343).
There are a number of culturally available frames in elite discourse (Gamson & Modigiani 1987).
“Frames in comm. matter—that is they affect the attitudes and beaviors of their audiences” (109).
What are individual-level mediators and moderators of framing?
Eagly & Chaiken (1993): Available, Accessible, and Applicable
AVAILABLE
“In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration—say free speech in the evaluation of a hate group’s right to rally—needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. If, for example, an individual fails to understand the concept of free speech, then free speech is not an available consideration and the individual will not be affected by a free speech frame” (110).
ACCESIBLE
“In addition to being available, the consideration must be accessible, meaning its activation potential must exceed a certain threshold so that the consideration is retrieved from long-term memory” (110).
The individual’s “frame of thought” (105).
APPLICABLE
“Evaluations of applicability occur if one of the following 2 considerations is met: they must be motivated and they must deliberate over alternatives” (110).
“In sun, people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three levels, by making new believes available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, o making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations” (111).
“Obviously, one’s frame in through can have a marked impacted on one’s overall opinion. For this reason, politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies long particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values (Jacoby 2000, 51).
People have inconsistent opinions, if they have them at all (Converse1964; Zaller 1992).
Strong frames often rest on symbols, etc. heuristics rather than direct information.
A frame’s strength depends on:
(1) repetition of frame
(2) competitive environment
(3) individual motivations
Moderators:
a. indiv. Values “indivs who have strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values (Brewer 2003; Gross 2000). Usually we are given competing frames. When this is the case, we choose the alt. that is consistent with our values (Sniderman & Theriault 2004). It increases our internal consistency. But Chong & Druckman find that the more competitive frame usually wins out, and there is potential for either side to steal voters.
b. Knowledge—framing effects stronger on less educated (Kinder & Sanders 1990 ; Haider-Markel & Jaslyn 2001). Stronger on more educated (Miller & Krosnik 2000; Nelson et al. 1997). Druckman & Nelson (2003) find that “after controlling for prior attitudes, knowledge enhances framing effects because it increases the likelihood that the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual” (112). See Lodge & Taber (2000) for discussion over stability of opinion v. dogmatic inflexibility (Chong & Druckman 120): “At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative framings of a problem; at the other extreme we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits clthe same close-minded response.” DELIBERATION!! Openness to contrarary evidence is essential. And should be fostered in a democracy. “People’s familiarity with this issue prior to the experiment does not appear to have inoculated them against manipulation (119). “A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations or arguments by independently generating courterarguments against one-sided frames” (119). = Top of the Head argument, rings true (Zaller 1992).
c. Source credibility (112).
Priming (Iyengar & Kinder 1987): “by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, tv news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged. Priming prefers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (63).
Framing v. Persuasion
Nleson & Oxley (1999): there is distinction between changing the content of one’s beliefs (persuasion) and changing the weight assigned to different beliefs in one’s overall attitude (framing).
Framing can be positive or negative:
It can rally people around a shared prediction.
Or, its can signify elite manipulation.
Entman (2004): Cascade Model:
Frames originate from the administration shape the frames used by other elites (. e.g. members of Congress), media outlets, and the public. However the public’s reaction to the initial frame feeds back to the media and other elites, who then influence the admins revised view.
“Balanced debate can diminish framing effects only if citizens are capable of learning over the course of a campaign. An individual can claim to have an opinion only if his or her views can be distinguished from the set of considerations temporarily made accessible by the content of a communication. A doorstep opinion” or an opinion constructed “on the fly” is not a real opinion if it is inseparable from the context in which it was elicited” (119).
“The inferences we can draw from previous studies suggest only limited inoculation against framing effects in all but the most knowledgeable members of the public. If citizens are inoculated on longstanding issues, we should see considerable resistance to one-sided frames on these issues. However, studies show that experimental participants continue to be affected by one-sided frames on issues that have been much debated in the past” (119). But one-sided frames do have a greater impact on those that are less knowledgeable (119). Manipulation.
“Competition therefore may only increase the short-term accessibility of alternative considerations. A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations of arguments by independently generating counterarguments against one-sided frames. “These results may appear to render framing effects more innocuous, but they may also indicate that individuals are continually susceptible to the most recent communication. If people soon forget what they learn, then they are less likely to be inoculated against subsequent attempts to influence them. The benefits of a balanced debate in a political campaign depend on the capacity of citizens to retain information about alternative positions so that they are not unduly influenced by the latest message they receive” (119).
“To the extent that people do not have independent ideas on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the framing of proposals. If people remain outside the political process, their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped by arbitrarily by how the issue is represented” (122).
Individuals who hold strong attitudes are least susceptible to new information, most likely to counter argue against contrary information, and most likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs” (120). Thus stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evals (120). “Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait
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