Manza (2002) Public Opinion

215 Public Opinion
manipulation and government responsiveness

Manza (2002)

Chapter 1 The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: The State of the Debate (Manza & Cook)
This chapter examines the current debate on the IMPACT of public opinion on policy. There are three (3) images of the impact:
(1) Large Effects images of the impact of p.o.; effects of public opinion on policy making supported by empirical work and quantitative studies that report a strong correlation between majority opinion on an issue and policy outcomes. Case study research returns similar findings. (Erikson, MacKuen, Stimson)

(2)Small effects images of the impact p.o.; only a limited connection between p.o. and policy outcome because either:
(a) Elites manipulate, control or direct p.o., thus any correlation is spurious; and they do so without fear of retribution. Politicians please IGs, activists, and articulate actors. (Jacobs & Shapiro would fit here—they write in subsequent chapters (3 and 10 about “crafted talk”)
(b) p.o. lacks coherence, thus cannot produce an independent causal impact—non-attitudes (see Campbell 1964) (an issue of political sophistication in both cases?)

(3) Contingency effect: in some contexts p.o. moves policy, and in others it does not (when it is more organized due to motivation, information, salience of issue? Or when it is loudest? Or it is most constistent, sustained (Jacobs 1994)?). (V.O. Key’s work fits in this category). “Depending on the particular issue, Congress members say they are influenced differently by what the public thinks” (27).


Chapter 2 Public Opinion and Policy: Causal Flow in a Macro System Model (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson)
Large effects view. Systems Model. Analyzing the changes in public MOOD and governmental outcomes (policy (measured as legislation) or policy activity (measured as movement on issues/topics etc).
Independent variable—mood: measured by condensing available public opinion across a wide range of policies into single indicator.
Dependent variable—conservative/liberal policy: activity or laws adopted in each year.
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) strongly contend that the issues of the day are a reflection of the public mood, meeting the goal of democratic theory in the expression of a “ causal dynamic by which the preferences of constituencies cause the behavior of the representatives…” (36). Using both cross-sectional (raw correlations) and time-series (“exploits temporal order to infer causal order” (36)) data, the authors come to the same conclusions: policy activity and policy reflects the public mood. As mood expressed more liberal ideals, policy did as well. As policies became more liberal, mood became more conservative, and the polcies then reflected the shift.
Authors also address this as a ‘”feedback” process through which policies influence later public opinion (similar to Hacker 2002; Campbell 2003, though not identical).


Chapter 3 Politics and Policymaking in the Real World: Crafted Talk and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Jacobs and Shapiro)
small-effects view.
Small effects due to Institutional and Historical changes: influence of activists within party organizations, IG activity growth… The findings of Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson (2002) are challenged by Jacobs & Shapiro. Certain institutional changes have altered the landscape and, in turn, the ability of presidents to manipulate, instead of follow, public opinion. Jacobs & Shapiro (2000; 2002) site partisan polarization, institutional individuation, incumbency bias, interest group proliferation, proximity of elections, caucuses and primaries, and the move toward candidate-centered campaigning as enabling politicians to get away with “crafted talk.” Crafted talk is language that is designed to elicit responses in tune with an administration’s or politician’s own, predetermined, policy goals. And their conception of the public interest. This is achieved by way of focus groups and polls that uncover words, symbols and stories that coerce positive feelings toward the already set agenda (see also Cook, Barabas & Page chapter 8). For example, focus groups might uncover more positive feelings toward “opportunity scholarships” as opposed to “vouchers.” If this were the case a politician in support of vouchers would use “opportunity scholarship” language to attract support for his or her policy position. Uncovering the use of language in this manner lends support to scholars who reject the claim that heuristic short cuts are tantamount to full political knowledge (Popkin 1991, 1993; Kuklinski & Quirk 2000; Iyengar 1990); the “opportunity scholarship” heuristic is misleading.
The Authors thus suggest a different link between p.o. and policy than that of Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson. Instead of politicians following p.o. they use p.o. constructively—strategic uses of p.o. to create crafted talk. Conceptualized politicians as self-interested, election-focued.

Chapter 4 Panderers or Shirkers? Politicians and Public Opinion (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson)
respond to Jacobs and Shapiro.


Chapter 7 The Power Elite, Public Policy and Public Opinion (Domhoff)
Bound-effects view? Power Elite Model
Elites have the power; public opinion only moves policy within the constraints established by the agenda already set by elites. Says that when Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, by focusing on the movement of p.o. over time, see the trees but miss the forest. Elites ensure that certain policy ideas are never considered in the first place .
Domhoff (2002) recognizes how power can shape public opinion on more complex issues, such as economic, defense, and foreign policy issues. In his analysis, the source of power is “a dominant social class consisting of the owners and managers of large income-producing properties” (124):
Their predominant power is demonstrated by their large—and growing—share of the wealth and income distributions, their disproportionate share of high-level appointments in Washington, and the fact that they win far more often than they lose on the policy issues of concern to them…The power elite prevails more often than not through...special interest, policy planning, opinion shaping, and candidate selection (125).

The power elite shape
(1) the special interest process
(2) the policy planning process
(3) the opinion shaping process
(4) the candidate selection process
The special interest process is shaped elitist lobbying of legislatures. Although interest group influence is high, corporate v. corporate interests sometime limit their effect, as do rises in iberal or labor group organization mobilization.
Policy-planning is influenced by elite think tanks.
The ways in which the power elite shape public opinion are three-fold: (1) through donations to political leaders, who in-turn give speeches and press conferences which influence the general public; (2) through directors who use their money to form policy discussion groups lead by speakers who push the agenda of the upper-class onto the public; and through (3) public relation firms which are funded by the upper class to create stories or poll results which are to be picked up by the media and then trickle down to the public, or more directly, through gifts or threats to the general public. In each scenario, the elites’ money plays the lead-role and enables them to lead pubic opinion.
Candidate selection: the 2 major parties are the only viable parties (Duverge’s Law); this is the class-dominance model, and it holds that those with power maintain their power.
In conclusion, politicians are in tune with the power elite because they have a direct stake in politics, and the elites have a lot of control over the politicians career (contributions, etc). More moderate interests are not as well organized, and are often divided on race, religion, or class. The power elite are more homogenous, and it is to their advantage.

Chapter 8 Policy Elites Invoke Public Opinion: Polls, Policy Debates, and the Future of Social Security (Cook, Barabas & Page)
Elites construct public views to advance policy positions. For example, in the SS debate, politicians claim that young people do not believe they will receive their SS when they retire. But this claim “rests on extremely misleading polling data and has been overturned by subsequent surveys with more adequate tests…” (8). Yet it is a claim that politicians still use when debating SS. Thus, politicians invoke public opinion to support positions they already hold. This argument is similar to Jacobs and Shapiro and “crafted talk.”

Chapter 9 How State-Level Policy Managers “Read” Public Opinion (Herbst)
At the state-level there is less polling data available. Thus state-level politicians “read” p.o. in other ways. For instance, policy-managers pay close attention to the arguments of IGs (me: good indicator of PUBLIC opinion?), and the media (i.e. newspapers) to stay “in-tune.” Thus at the state-level politicians receive flawed in-puts. Exposed to biases in local news (more episodic; sensationalist due to market-based news/trying to sell! And attract viewers). Why should we assume its okay for policy-makers to listen to this? In the past, I thought we assumed local politicians read their letters to get a sense of the public sentiment. But WHO writes the letters? Fringe? At the local level do we elect a trustee, instead of a delegate?

Chapter 10 Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and Democracy: How Presidents Use Public Opinion (Shapiro & Jacobs)
Shift to a Foreign policy p.o. focus. FP is less a subject of analysis because the public tends to be more uninformed about FP than domestic issues (me: since Iraq, is this still the case? And is the media the reason? Or personal interest, such as “I know a soldier?). The author’s results mimic their earlier results on domestic issue p.o. influence, only a bit heighted: politicians use “crafted talk” and the public voice is increasingly confused.
Shapiro & Jacobs find crafted talk to be especially pronounced when politicians discuss foreign policy. Although they review numerous examples of presidents responding to public opinion, such as Nixon and the troop with drawl from Vietnam, they argue, “that the dominant contemporary trend is toward less presidential responsiveness and greater efforts at leading or manipulating public opinion” (192). Thus, along with the aforementioned institutional shifts that have given way to “crafted talk” on domestic issues, these institutional changes coupled with a more confused electorate—which is often the case in matters of foreign policy—creates prime conditions for politicians to lead and manipulate public opinion. In the wake of institutional shifts and heightened electorate confusion, politicians have power over public opinion and “create the appearance of responsiveness as they pursue their desired policy goals” (Jacobs & Shapiro 2002, 55, emphasis added). As in their earlier chapter, this is due to institutional changes in the political system.

Chapter 11 How Policymakers Misperceive U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (Kull & Ramsay)
The authors find evidence of inconsistencies between public opinion and public policy, and that it is increasing over time. They also find that the public perceives policy-makers to misunderstand them.
Elites badly misunderstand the nature of public attitudes; they assume the public is isolationist (based on earlier interviews in Kull & Destker 1999). Gathering new data from a survey that taps isolationist sentiment, the author’s show that the public is more internationalist and supportive of programs designed to aid poor foreign countries than experts think (me: I think historical context matters on this one. For instance, right now I would say that given the mess in Iraq, yes. But shortly after 9/11?—no way—look hard at their data and when it was gathered). Thus, politicians take public opinion for granted.

16 The Sovereign Status of Survey Data (Lee)

18 The Semi-Sovereign Public (Page)