Chong & Druckman (2007) Framing Theory

Chong & Druckman (2007) “Framing Theory”

A review of framing and the effects of framing on public opinion.

Framing: the process by when people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980; Nelson et al. 1990).
Framing Effects: occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue of an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion.

Frames in Communication (106) “the key considerations emphasized in a speech act” (106).
Frames in Comm “organizinges everyday realitly”. They provide meaning to a strip of events. And promote certain definitions over others, and encourage a particular interpretation (Shah et al, 202, 343).

There are a number of culturally available frames in elite discourse (Gamson & Modigiani 1987).

“Frames in comm. matter—that is they affect the attitudes and beaviors of their audiences” (109).

What are individual-level mediators and moderators of framing?
Eagly & Chaiken (1993): Available, Accessible, and Applicable
AVAILABLE
“In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration—say free speech in the evaluation of a hate group’s right to rally—needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. If, for example, an individual fails to understand the concept of free speech, then free speech is not an available consideration and the individual will not be affected by a free speech frame” (110).
ACCESIBLE
“In addition to being available, the consideration must be accessible, meaning its activation potential must exceed a certain threshold so that the consideration is retrieved from long-term memory” (110).
The individual’s “frame of thought” (105).
APPLICABLE
“Evaluations of applicability occur if one of the following 2 considerations is met: they must be motivated and they must deliberate over alternatives” (110).
“In sun, people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three levels, by making new believes available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, o making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations” (111).

“Obviously, one’s frame in through can have a marked impacted on one’s overall opinion. For this reason, politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies long particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values (Jacoby 2000, 51).
People have inconsistent opinions, if they have them at all (Converse1964; Zaller 1992).

Strong frames often rest on symbols, etc. heuristics rather than direct information.

A frame’s strength depends on:
(1) repetition of frame
(2) competitive environment
(3) individual motivations
Moderators:
a. indiv. Values “indivs who have strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values (Brewer 2003; Gross 2000). Usually we are given competing frames. When this is the case, we choose the alt. that is consistent with our values (Sniderman & Theriault 2004). It increases our internal consistency. But Chong & Druckman find that the more competitive frame usually wins out, and there is potential for either side to steal voters.
b. Knowledge—framing effects stronger on less educated (Kinder & Sanders 1990 ; Haider-Markel & Jaslyn 2001). Stronger on more educated (Miller & Krosnik 2000; Nelson et al. 1997). Druckman & Nelson (2003) find that “after controlling for prior attitudes, knowledge enhances framing effects because it increases the likelihood that the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual” (112). See Lodge & Taber (2000) for discussion over stability of opinion v. dogmatic inflexibility (Chong & Druckman 120): “At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative framings of a problem; at the other extreme we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits clthe same close-minded response.” DELIBERATION!! Openness to contrarary evidence is essential. And should be fostered in a democracy. “People’s familiarity with this issue prior to the experiment does not appear to have inoculated them against manipulation (119). “A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations or arguments by independently generating courterarguments against one-sided frames” (119). = Top of the Head argument, rings true (Zaller 1992).
c. Source credibility (112).

Priming (Iyengar & Kinder 1987): “by calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, tv news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged. Priming prefers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (63).

Framing v. Persuasion
Nleson & Oxley (1999): there is distinction between changing the content of one’s beliefs (persuasion) and changing the weight assigned to different beliefs in one’s overall attitude (framing).


Framing can be positive or negative:
It can rally people around a shared prediction.

Or, its can signify elite manipulation.


Entman (2004): Cascade Model:
Frames originate from the administration shape the frames used by other elites (. e.g. members of Congress), media outlets, and the public. However the public’s reaction to the initial frame feeds back to the media and other elites, who then influence the admins revised view.

“Balanced debate can diminish framing effects only if citizens are capable of learning over the course of a campaign. An individual can claim to have an opinion only if his or her views can be distinguished from the set of considerations temporarily made accessible by the content of a communication. A doorstep opinion” or an opinion constructed “on the fly” is not a real opinion if it is inseparable from the context in which it was elicited” (119).

“The inferences we can draw from previous studies suggest only limited inoculation against framing effects in all but the most knowledgeable members of the public. If citizens are inoculated on longstanding issues, we should see considerable resistance to one-sided frames on these issues. However, studies show that experimental participants continue to be affected by one-sided frames on issues that have been much debated in the past” (119). But one-sided frames do have a greater impact on those that are less knowledgeable (119). Manipulation.

“Competition therefore may only increase the short-term accessibility of alternative considerations. A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations of arguments by independently generating counterarguments against one-sided frames. “These results may appear to render framing effects more innocuous, but they may also indicate that individuals are continually susceptible to the most recent communication. If people soon forget what they learn, then they are less likely to be inoculated against subsequent attempts to influence them. The benefits of a balanced debate in a political campaign depend on the capacity of citizens to retain information about alternative positions so that they are not unduly influenced by the latest message they receive” (119).

“To the extent that people do not have independent ideas on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the framing of proposals. If people remain outside the political process, their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped by arbitrarily by how the issue is represented” (122).


Individuals who hold strong attitudes are least susceptible to new information, most likely to counter argue against contrary information, and most likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs” (120). Thus stable opinions are a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evals (120). “Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative frames of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same close-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait